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Abstract
This is a survey of models of general equilibrium with incomplete markets and corpo-
rations. The intuition behind several of the difficulties that arise in these models is
discussed. Interesting issues are pointed out also.
1 INTRODUCTION 1
1 Introduction
In this survey we discuss several problems that arise when we consider a GEI (General
Equilibrium with Incomplete Markets) economy with production, in which each firm is
a corporation. A precise definition of a corporation is given in [19, Chapter 6] and this
is the definition that we shall adopt. A corporation may be defined as a firm with three
properties:
1. its capital (ownership) is divided into shares (equity contracts);
2. each shareholder is liable for the company’s debts up to an amount limited to the
current value of his equity share;
3. the company’s equity contracts are traded on a stock market.
The third property is essential to the definition of corporation since it is what dis-
tinguishes a corporation from other structures of ownership like sole proprietorships and
partnerships. The possession of a positive amount of a firm’s share (equity contract),
represents a commitment from the owner to the corporation. However, this commitment
is short term in nature, in the sense that every owner of the firm’s shares can decide to
sell those shares at any given date.
The structure of ownership of the corporation brings the phenomenon of separation
of ownership and control. Now the firm is owned by a large number of shareholders
which are changing at any given date, so it would be impractical to have all of them run
the firm on a daily basis. It is however supposed that managers of the firm, run it in
the best interest of shareholders. This will be given a precise meaning when we discuss
the objective function of the firm.
Even if managers act in the best interest of shareholders, it remains to define clearly
which shareholders. Decisions of production and investment may carry long time con-
sequences and the set of shareholders at the moment those decisions are made, may
differ substantially to the set of shareholders at the moment in which those plans are
implemented.
In this survey, we present examples of basic GEI models with firms. We use these
models to exemplify and discuss the intuition of the basic problems that arise when
dealing with this kind of models. The papers discussed here, constitute the classical
literature in these subjects. The second section of this paper introduces the models that
we use as examples and describe the problem of the firm, that is, which should be the
firm’s objective and how to achieve it. The third section presents some of the properties
of GEI models with firms and discusses the classical literature on these subjects. Section
four concludes.
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2 The problem of the firm
2.1 Two GEI models with firms
While trying to give a panoramic view of the literature in the subjects that concern us,
we will pay special attention to two models: a basic model presented in [19, Chapter 6],
and a model extracted from [2]. This will allow us to get some insight into the conceptual
and technical difficulties that are to be discussed later. It will also help us to provide
concrete examples.
2.1.1 Basic model
This is a two-period economy where dates are numbered 0 and 1. At date 1, there are
S ≥ 1 possible states of nature whose purpose is to account for future uncertainty. For
convenience we will refer to date t = 0 as state s = 0. There is a finite set of consumers
indexed by I = {1, . . . , I} and a finite set of firms indexed by K = {1, · · · ,K}. There is a
single consumption good at each state of nature, and so, a consumption plan for consumer
i, denoted by xi, is a vector in RS+1+ = {(x1, . . . , xS+1) ∈ RS+1|xs ≥ 0, s = 1, . . . , S+ 1}.
Consumer i is characterized by a utility function ui : RS+1+ → R and initial endow-
ment ωi ∈ RS+1+ , for i ∈ I. Firms are described by K exogenously given technology sets:
Y k ⊂ RS+1 describes the income streams yk = (yk0 , yk1 , · · · , ykS) generated by investment
projects available to “firm” k, for k ∈ K. Note that from the beginning, we assume the
existence of these firms and are not concerned in how they came to be. Later, when
we endow the firm with a more definite structure of ownership (a corporation), our
only interest will be in the operation of these firms, and not in their possible creation
or destruction. To ensure the existence of an equilibrium, we will make the following
assumptions on the technology sets:
Assumption T. The technology sets Y k (k ∈ K) have the following properties1:
1. Y k ⊂ RS+1 is closed
2. Y k is convex
3. Y k ⊃ RS+1−
4. Y k ∩ RS+1+ = {0}
5. (ω +
∑K
k=1 Y
k) ∩ RS+1+ is compact for all ω ∈ RS+1+
The financial structure of the economy, as a whole, is represented by a bond market
on which J bonds are traded and a stock market on which the equity contracts for the
K corporations are traded.
In the bond market, Rjs denotes the exogenously given payoff of the jth bond in state
s ∈ S \ {0} and Rs = (R1s, · · · , RJs ), s = 1, · · · , S denotes the vector of payoffs of the J
1These assumptions are standard in general equilibrium theory (see, for example, [4, Chapter 3]).
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bonds in state s. Let p = (p1, · · · , pJ) represent the vector of prices for the J bonds. A
portfolio of the J bonds is represented by b = (b1, · · · , bJ).
In the equity market, let θi0 ∈ RK+ represent the vector of initial ownership shares
of agent i in the K firms. The ownership shares θ0 = (θ
1
0, · · · , θI0) are assumed to
satisfy
∑
i θ
i
0 = 1 ∈ RK . That is, the outstanding amount of equity is normalized to 1.
Transactions on the stock market are assumed to be costless, so we may assume that
agent i sells his portfolio θi0 ∈ RK of initial ownership and purchases the new portfolio
θi ∈ RK . The vector of prices on the K equity contracts is denoted by q = (q1, · · · , qK).
2.1.2 Stylized model
This model is very similar to our basic model and we maintain, whenever possible, the
same notation. Again, we consider two dates and S different states of nature at date 1.
Now, I = {1, · · · , I} is a set of indexes for the types of consumers, so there are I different
types of consumers. The same is valid for firms but now K = 1 so that there is only
one type of firm. There is a continuum of firms, of unit mass, as well as a continuum of
consumers of each type i, also set to have unit mass.
Consumers are again characterized by utility functions Eui : RS+1+ → R and initial
endowment ωi ∈ RS+1+ , for i ∈ I. Function ui is assumed to be continuously differen-
tiable, increasing and concave.
Instead of production sets2 Y , firms are described by the function f(k, φ; s) : K ×
Φ × {1, · · · , S} → R, where k ∈ K ⊂ R+ is the amount of input invested in capital at
date 0, φ is a technology choice affecting the stochastic structure of the output at date
1. We assume that f is continuosly differentiable, increasing in k and concave in k, φ.
Finally, Φ and K are closed, compact subsets of R+ and 0 ∈ K.
Firms take both production and financial decisions, and their equity and debt (in
bonds) are the only assets in the economy. Referring to our basic model, J = 1. Since
the total amount of equity is, at the beginning, normalized to 1 (
∑
i θ
i
0 = 1), we will
assume that this is kept constant so that the firm’s capital structure is only given by
the decision concerning the amount B of bonds issued, which will equate the firm’s
debt/equity ratio. The problem of the firm consists in the choice of its production plan
k, φ and its financial structure B.
Again, the price of the bonds is represented by p ∈ R and the price of the equity by
q ∈ R
2.2 The firm’s objective function
Consider our basic model, we begin by supposing that the production plan is financed by
the original shareholders, so if agent i is an initial shareholder of firm k, he contributes
yk0θ
i
0,k as his share of the input costs of the firm. The budget constraints of agent i at
dates 0 and 1, respectively, are given by:
2We dispense with the index since there is only one type of firm, and use k instead to represent the
amount of input invested in capital at time 0.
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xi0 − ωi0 = −pbi + (y0 + q)θi0 − qθi (1)
xis − ωis = Rsbi + ysθi, s = 1, · · · , S (2)
The term −pbi represents the cost incurred by the agent at date 0 to buy portfolio bi
of bonds, term qθi0 corresponds to the income obtained by the sale of its initial portfolio
of shares and qθi the cost of buying new portfolio θi. At date 1, state s of nature, Agent
i receives the income Rsb
i from his bonds portfolio, and income ysθ
i, which corresponds
to his share of the production of all firms from which he purchased equity shares at date
0.
For now, we bypass the problem of the separation of ownership and control by assum-
ing that owners (original shareholders) of firm k, are directly involved in the process of
deciding the production plan that the firm should adopt. Each shareholder will consider
two ways in which the adopted production plan will affect his income: first, at date 0
he will get the income (y0 + q)θ
i
0, which also represents the (date 0) value of the firm,
second, he also has rights to income stream across the S + 1 states [−qk, ŷk]′θik, where
ŷk = (yk1 , · · · , ykS) represents the income stream generated by production in the different
states of nature at date 1.
The first term represents the market value of the firm at date 0, the second term
represents the insurance services provided by the portfolio of equities θi at date 1,
that is, once production plans are fixed, firms equity shares have the same function of
transferring wealth among the different possible states of nature that any other financial
asset has. These possibilities of insurance are called the spanning services of the firm’s
equity contract.
Most of literature has as an objective function the maximization of the market value
of the firm. This means, ignoring the second way in which the production plan affects
income (the spanning services). Different justifications for this can be found in the
literature.
One of these justifications if formalized in what is called the spanning property or the
partial spanning assumption. Capital Asset Pricing Model has this property, it has it in
the space of mean and variance, which in that model are the determinants of utility. For
a discussion on the subject a good source is Drèze [9]. Other examples of this justification
are found in Diamond [7] and in Ekern [11]. The intuition behind the reason for which
this restriction (the spanning condition) leads us to adopt market value maximization,
is that changes in the equity contract of a particular firm will not affect the insurance
possibilities (the spanning services) offered in the stock market. A firm cannot create
new spanning opportunities by altering its production plan, so .
A second justification found in the literature is the one provided in Grossman and
Hart [14]. The main assumption, known as competitive price perception is that each
consumer considers the benefit obtained from purchasing an equity share θik, exactly
compensated by its price qk, then, clearly, the spanning term will not affect the agent’s
choice of production plan.
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If either of these assumptions hold, maximization of the market value of the firm is
justified as the objective each agent would pursue when considering the production plan
to be implemented. This market value, given by the expression (y0 + q), depends on the
price of the firms’ equities. But, what is or should be the price of the equity contract
of the firm? This question is intimately related to the objective of the firm. After all,
agents will be able to maximize the value of the firm only if they know how to calculate
this value. This relationship is discussed further in the following subsection.
2.3 Pricing functions
When considering the market value of the firm, and the decision of which production
plan to adopt, agents (initial shareholders) must take into account the price of the
firm’s equity to determine this value, however, depending on which production plan
they choose, the equity contract of the firm, traded in the stock market, becomes a
different financial asset, since it generates a different stream of income across the states
of nature at date 1, and so, it provides different insurance opportunities.
What agents need is a way to determine, or guess, which should be the price of
the firms equity depending on the production plan adopted. This can be done without
ambiguity when markets are complete and this case will be discussed briefly. We are most
interested, however, in the case of incomplete markets since, after all, the assumption of
incomplete markets seems much more reasonable.
2.3.1 Complete markets
If markets are complete, the price of any cash flow generated by a production plan,
can be determined unambiguously. Intuitively, given any income stream at date 1, a
portfolio using other assets (bonds) of the financial market can be constructed, such
that it pays the same income stream at date 1. The prices of those other assets (bonds)
are known and the price of the portfolio is well determined. Since the original income
stream and the portfolio provide the same insurance possibilities, their prices should be
equal if there are no arbitrage possibilities in the economy (a necessary condition for the
existence of competitive equilibrium).
Being a bit more formal, the absence of arbitrage implies the existence of S state
prices3. These state prices, π = (π1, · · · , πS) can be used to evaluate the price of any
income stream ỹ ∈ RS at date 1 in the following manner:
qk =
S∑
s=1
πsỹs (3)
Moreover, when financial markets are complete, the vector of state prices is uniquely
determined, so evaluation of income streams (production plans) by all the initial share-
holders of the firm (and all agents in the economy) will be the same. Maximization of
the value of the firm, (yk0 + q), can be perfomed. It is easy to see that in this case, state
3See, for example, Cass [3].
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prices are unique. Consider the matrix of payments of all (bonds and equities) assets in
the economy:
[R y] =
R
1
1 · · · RJ1 y11 · · · yK1
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
R1S · · · RJS y1S · · · yKS
 (4)
If financial markets are complete, rank[R y] = S. Since there is no arbitrage, using
(3), π[R y] = [p q], and there is a unique vector of state prices π given a vector of
(observed) security prices [p q].
2.3.2 Incomplete Markets
When markets are incomplete (rank[R y] < S), if there is no arbitrage, a vector of state
prices still exists, but it is not uniquely determined. Intuitively, prices of existing assets
might not be enough to determine without ambiguity the value of any income stream.
An exception occurs when the partial spanning assumption is satisfied. We present this
assumption as in Magill-Quinzii [19]:
Partial Spanning Assumption. There is a linear subspace Z ⊂ RS+1 whose dimension is
at most K, such that Y k ⊂ Z, k = 1, · · · ,K.
If this assumption holds, it is clear that any production plan of firm k generates an
income stream that can be represented or constructed as a portfolio of the other assets in
the economy, the price is then unambiguously determined. In terms of state prices, even
though different shareholders of firm k’s equity, might use different state price vectors to
evaluate production plans (income streams), the resulting evaluation will be the same,
regardless of the state price vector chosen. Again, maximization of the market value of
the firm y0 + q can be performed, and it is clear to every agent which production plan is
optimal in this sense, that is, the decision is unanimous. Unanimity is another subject
that interests us and will be discussed latter.
In the literature, the spanning condition is introduced in [11] by Ekern and Wilson
to identify conditions for unanimity. Radner, in [29], reinterprets Ekern and Wilson’s
analysis in “standard Arrow-Debreu” terms and provides conditions under which ex ante
and ex post stockholders are unanimous in their decisions.
Now, consider the situation in which the spanning condition does not hold. In this
case, the standard assumption made in the literature is that firms4 “guess” or conjecture
a price function qk : RS+1 → R for the price of firm k’s equity, depending on the
production plan adopted yk ∈ RS+1. How should this conjecture be made? Throughout
the literature, we can find different answers.
Grossman and Hart introduce in [14] the following price function, expressed in the
language of our basic model:
4Here, by firms we are referring to firms’ management which is composed by shareholders or to act
in shareholders’ best interest.
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qk(y
k) =
∑
i∈Ik
θi0,kπ
i(x̄i)yk, ∀yk ∈ Y k (5)
where Ik = {i ∈ I|θio,k > 0} is the set of shareholders of firm k, πi(x̄i) = (πi1(x̄i), · · · ,
πiS(x̄
i)), and πis(x̄
i) ≡ (∂u
i(x̄i)
∂xis
)/(∂u
i(x̄i)
∂xi0
) = MRS
i
(s) is the marginal rate of substitution
between present consumption and consumption at date 1, state s, and represents the
own personal evaluation of state s by agent i. If each agent which is a stockholder of
firm k, evaluates any future income stream yk as5
∑S
s=1 π
i
s(x̄
i)yks , equation (5) tells us
that the firm evaluates the income stream yk using a weighted average of the private
evaluations of its (initial) stockholders, and using as weights the number of shares each
stockholder possesses at the moment of the decision.
In the language of our stylized model, Grossman and Hart’s pricing function could
be written as
qk(k, φ,B) = E
∑
i
θi0MRS
i
(s)[f(k, φ; s)−B], ∀k,B (6)
A similar pricing function, introduced explicitly by Drèze [8] and previously implied
by Diamond [7] is:
qk(y
k) =
∑
i∈Ik
θikπ
i(x̄i)yk, ∀yk ∈ Y k (7)
Where the only difference with Grossman-Hart’s pricing function is that now it is
the quantities of shares owned by final stockholders the ones used as weights for the
private evaluations of future income streams. In the language of our stylized model:
qk(k, φ,B) = E
∑
i
θiMRS
i
(s)[f(k, φ; s)−B], ∀k,B (8)
Of these latter pricing functions, which one is more appropriate? Grossman and Hart
point out in their paper [14] that conceptually, the answer depends on how legally binding
the decisions of initial shareholders are. They say that “In general, as ownership changes,
there will be pressure on the firm to change its production plan. The incompleteness
of markets at the initial date prevents agreement between all present and future owners
as to the worth of contemplated production plans. As a result, the balance of power
between shareholders at different dates in the determination of production decisions
becomes crucially important”.
Under the assumption that commitment to a production plan by initial shareholders
is legally binding, Grossman and Hart’s model, with its assumption of competitive price
perceptions and its respective pricing function (which is a direct consequence of this
assumption) has the advantage that it allows us to consider shareholders that take into
account the effect of their decisions on the firm’s equity price. This characteristic is
missing in Diamond’s and Drèze’s model.
5This is the essence of the competitive price perceptions assumption made in [14].
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A third kind of price function proposed in the literature corresponds the one presented
in Bisin et al. [2] from where we borrow our stylized model. Similar pricing functions
appear in Makowski [20] and [21], in Makoski and Ostroy [22], in Allen and Gale [1] and
Pesendorfer [28].
The seminal paper is Makowski [21] where he based his analysis on Joseph Ostroy’s
no surplus characterization of perfect competition6. The problem of timing and coor-
dination between initial and final shareholder’s does not arise since, in a sense, firms
“choose” simultaneously shareholders and productions plans. This model, with its pric-
ing function, has the desirable characteristic of unanimity among shareholders. This
characteristic is lacking in Grossman and Hart´s model, in which, shareholders agree in
defining as objective of the firm the maximization of (current) market value, but disagree
in which is the plan that maximizes this value. To solve this problem, Grossman and
Hart introduce a scheme of side payments that facilitate an agreement.
In Makowski’s model, initial shareholders sell their shares to individuals having the
highest evaluation for the firm’s income stream and ex-post (final) shareholders in each
period form an homogeneous group. Makowski’s pricing function is such that the equi-
librium prices of shares in the firms are sufficiently high, so that all individuals except
final shareholders do not want to buy firm’s shares. In our stylized model:
qk(k, φ,B) = max
i
E[MRSi(s)(f(k, φ; s)−B)], ∀k,B (9)
2.3.3 Equilibrium
Although we have discussed the basic setting of our two models, we still have not pre-
sented the appropriate definition of equilibrium. As it turns out, the “correct” definition
of equilibrium depends on the assumptions we make and the pricing functions that we
use. The basic definition of equilibrium is still behind each of these slightly more sophis-
ticated definitions that we will consider: An equilibrium is an allocation of consumption
for every agent, such that every agent maximizes his utility, given his budget constraint;
an allocation of production plans, such that each firm maximizes its current value; and
a vector of prices for goods, bonds and equity shares such that goods, financial and stock
markets clear.
Consider first the cases of complete markets and of incomplete markets with par-
tial spanning. In these cases, we can proceed in two steps. In the first step, we can
consider an exchange equilibrium, that is, an equilibrium with fixed production plans
ȳ = (ȳ1, · · · , ȳK). Indeed, if production plans are fixed, equity shares of the different
firms play the same role as bonds. Grossman and Hart call this, the security role of the
shares7. In the second step, we ask that each firm maximizes its current value. In the
language of our basic model:
6See, for example, [26] and [27].
7As opposed to their ownership role, which simply consists on the claims of the shareholders on the
production plans of the firms.
2 THE PROBLEM OF THE FIRM 9
Definition 1. Let E(u, ω, θ0, R, Y ) denote an economy with complete markets or an
economy with incomplete markets that satisfies the partial spanning assumption. A
vector of allocations, portfolios, production plans and prices, ((x̄, b̄, θ̄, ȳ), (p̄, q̄)) (with
rank(ȳ) = dim Z whenever markets are incomplete), is a stock market equilibrium if,
given ȳ,
(i) (x̄i, b̄i, θ̄i) ∈ arg max{ui(xi)|(xi, bi, θi) ∈ B(p̄, q̄, ω̃i, R, ȳ)}, i = 1, · · · , I.
Where B(p̄, q̄, ω̃i, R, ȳ) = {xi ∈ RS+1+ |xi− ω̃i = W (b, θ−θ0)′}, ω̃ = ω+
∑K
k=1 θ0,ky
k,
and
W =

−p1 · · · −pJ −q1 · · · −qK
R11 · · · RJ1 y11 · · · yK1
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
R1S · · · RJS y1S · · · yKS

(ii)
∑I
i=1(b̄, θ̄ − θ0)′ = 0, and, ȳ is such that
(iii) ȳk ∈ arg max{πyk|yk ∈ Y k}, k = 1, · · · ,K, where π is a no-arbitrage state price
vector.
In this definition, (i) and (ii) correspond to an exchange equilibrium for fixed ȳ.
Maximization of the value of the firm is required in (iii). Note that if markets are
complete, π in (iii) is unique.
If markets are incomplete, and the competitive price perceptions assumption is sat-
isfied, we proceed in a similar manner to the previous case. Again, in the language of
our basic model:
Definition 2. Let E(u, ω, θ0, R, Y ) denote an economy with corporations in which the
competitive price perceptions assumption holds. A vector of allocations, portfolios, pro-
duction plans and prices, ((x̄, b̄, θ̄, ȳ), (p̄, q̄)), with rank(ȳ) = dim Z, whenever markets
are incomplete, is a stock market equilibrium if, given ȳ,
(i) (x̄i, b̄i, θ̄i) ∈ arg max{ui(xi)|(xi, bi, θi) ∈ B(p̄, q̄, ωi, θi0, R, ȳ)}, i = 1, · · · , I.
Where B(p̄, q̄, ωi, θi0, R, ȳ) = {xi ∈ R
S+1
+ |xi−ωi = (y0 +q)θi0e0 +W (b, θ−θ0)′}, and
e0 = (1, 0, · · · , 0) ∈ RS+1+ .
(ii)
∑I
i=1(b̄, θ̄ − θ0)′ = 0, and, ȳ is such that
(iii) ȳk ∈ arg max{
∑
i∈Ik θ
i
0,kπ
i(x̄i)yk|yk ∈ Y k}, k = 1, · · · ,K.
Again, (i) and (ii) can be viewed as corresponding to an exchange equilibrium for
fixed ȳ, and (iii) as the maximization of the value of the firm using Grossman and Hart’s
pricing function.
Finally, we will define the appropriate concept of equilibrium when considering
Makowski’s pricing function. One of such economies is the one of our stylized model:
Definition 3. A competitive equilibrium for the stylized economy is a collection (k̄, φ̄, B̄,
(c̄i, θ̄i, b̄i)i, p̄, q̄, q(·)), such that:
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(i) (k̄, φ̄, B̄) solve the problem of the firm:
max
k,φ,B
−k + q(k, φ,B) + pB
subject to
f(k, φ; s) ≥ B, ∀s ∈ S
(ii) for all i, (c̄i, θ̄i, b̄i) solve consumer i’s problem:
max
θi,bi,xi
Eui(xi)
subject to
xi0 − ωi0 = [−k̄ + q̄ + p̄B̄]θi0 − q̄θi − p̄bi
xis − ωis = [f(k̄, φ̄; s)− B̄]θi + bi, ∀s ∈ S
bi ≥ 0, θi ≥ 0, ∀i
(iii) markets clear: ∑
i
b̄i ≤ B∑
i
θ̄i ≤ 1
(iv) the equity price map satisfies:
q(k̄, φ̄, B̄) = q,
qk(k, φ,B) = max
i
E[MRSi(s)(f(k, φ; s)−B)], ∀k,B
Finally, we note (and do not prove) that for both of the economies considered, and
for all the definitions of equilibrium presented, a competitive equilibrium exists.
3 Properties of the models
Now that we have addressed some of the first difficulties encountered when dealing with
GEI models with firms, we pass to describe some of the most important and interesting
features of these models.
3.1 Unanimity
We have discussed which should be the appropriate objective of the firm and presented
several pricing functions. To support the use of any of these building blocks in a model,
a coherent story must be told about the decision process through which the shareholders
of a firm reach an agreement on how to carry out the firm’s objective. One of such
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stories, that has the nice feature of being simple (although arguably unrealistic in many
settings) is that the decision by the shareholders is unanimous.
As mentioned before, in Diamond [7] unanimity is obtained, but it was in Ekern and
Wilson [11] that the relationship between unanimity and the spanning condition was
explored. Later, Radner [29] studied Ekern and Wilson’s model in a standard general
equilibrium setting and stated the spanning condition in the form it was presented here.
In general, decisions are unanimous in models with partial spanning. The reason
is simple and has been already mentioned: although different individuals might use
different no-arbitrage state price vectors to evaluate date 1 income streams, evaluations
are the same. Shareholders of a given firm form an heterogeneous group but nevertheless,
agree on which production plan is the optimum.
The spanning condition is too restrictive. As Grossman and Hart [14] note: “If there
are many more states of the world than firms, then it is very likely that some firm will be
able to produce a vector of state contingent incomes which is not a linear combination
of the existing vectors of state contingent incomes.” In Grossman and Hart’s model,
decisions are not unanimous, instead, a different story is told: shareholders reach an
agreement by recourse to a side payments scheme which in fact is a simplification of a
more complex story of bids and takeovers. The moral is that in general, one should not
expect unanimity.
Models that correspond to our third pricing function (Makowski’s), have unanimity.
The spanning condition is not satisfied in such models but, as noted before, given the
pricing function of these models, only the agents who value the most the shares of the
firm, are the ones that actually buy the shares at any given date. Unanimity comes from
the fact that shareholders in these models conform an homogeneous group.
Hart [16] obtains an asymptotic result. He proves that for very large economies, “net
market value maximization (approximately) represents the wishes of all initial sharehold-
ers”. His result is not valid, however, for finite economies like the ones considered in our
examples. Even in very large, but finite, economies, the result is not valid and we must
seek comfort in the finding that in this case, “the gain to any one shareholder from a
departure from net market value maximization is small”.
3.2 Efficiency
Now we discuss the welfare properties of GEI models with firms. In general, equilibrium
allocations in these models will not be optimal in the general Pareto sense, instead,
most of the models mentioned so far are efficient in a more restricted sense known as
constrained Pareto optimality and introduced in GEI models with firms by Diamond [7].
We present this concept in the context of our stylized model:
In our stylized model, a consumption allocation xi is admissible if:
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1. it is feasible, that is, there exists a production plan k, φ of firms such that:∑
i
xi0 + k ≤
∑
i
ωi0∑
i
xis ≤
∑
i
ωis + f(k, φ; s), ∀s ∈ S
2. it is attainable with the existing asset structure, that is, there exists B and, for each
consumer of type i, a pair θi, bi such that:
xis = ω
i
s + [f(k, φ; s)−B]θi + bi, ∀s ∈ S
Definition 4. A competitive equilibrium allocation is constrained Pareto efficient if we
cannot find another admissible allocation which is Pareto improving, that is, that makes
no agent worse-off and makes some agents (strictly) better-off.
Why should we expect less than Pareto efficiency? In [15], Hart provides counterex-
amples where equilibrium allocations were Pareto dominated by other equilibrium allo-
cations8 The intuition is that consumers don’t have available all insurance possibilities
and some Pareto optimal allocations might be unreachable given the current financial
structure. Later, Grossman [13] showed that equilibria in GEI models with firms are
constrained Pareto efficient.
3.3 Modigliani-Miller
Modigliani and Miller [25] demonstrated the irrelevance of the financial structure of
the corporation in a partial equilibrium model. Their result is valid in the absence of
imperfections like taxes, transaction costs, bankruptcy costs, asymmetric information,
etc. The result was extended later by Stiglitz [31] to a general equilibrium model with
complete markets. Hellwig [17] examines again the validity of the result a GE model with
bankruptcy. DeMarzo [5] showed that the result holds even if markets are incomplete,
this was confirmed by Duffie and Shafer [10] and also mentioned by Magill and Quinzii
in [19] from where we extract our basic model.
A version of the result also holds for Diamond’s and Grossman and Hart’s models.
Regarding the stylized model in its original source [2], Modigliani-Miller theorem does
not necessarily hold when there exist borrowing conditions.
A nice survey on the subject, that reviews the first 30 years after the Modigliani-
Miller was first stated can be found in [24].
Gottardi [12] discusses the validity of the theorem when markets are incomplete, he
concludes that “in presence of any type of derivative security a change in the capital
structure of a firm will modify, generically, both the real equilibrium allocation and the
value of the firm. The reason is that the payoff of the derivative securities is affected
in a non-linear way by changes in the firm’s financial policy; thus the set of the agents’
8Hart’s counterexamples have multiple equilibria.
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insurance opportunities is also modified”. This result hampers the validity of Modigiani-
Miller’s theorem because, again in Gottardi’s words, “...the irrelevance result originates
from a fundamental linearity property of the problem, independent of the completeness
of the market. The change in the return on equity, induced by a modification of the
firm’s capital structure, is in effect a linear combination of the returns on the assets
traded by the firm. By the no arbitrage condition, the price of each asset is then also a
linear function of the income it generates in the future states of nature. These two facts
lie at the origin of the invariance both of the equilibrium allocation and of the firm’s
valuation”. Gottardi’s paper does not contradict DeMarzo’s result because it considers
derivatives in his model, a feature lacking in DeMarzo’s.
An more recent extension to incomplete markets, infinite horizon economies, can be
found in Thorsten [33]. More recent developments include [30].
The relevant conclusion is that if the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds in a General
Equilibrium model, equilibria are indeterminate, since the financial structure of the firm
is also indeterminate, however, departures from neo-classical assumptions usually have
the consequence of making financial decisions of firms relevant, we have seen that this is
the case with derivatives [12], bankruptcy [17], and borrowing constraints [2], it is also
the case with taxes [23] and asymmetric information [18].
4 Conclusion
We have presented two examples of models of general equilibrium with incomplete mar-
kets and firms. The firms considered in these models and in most of the literature dis-
cussed, are corporations. This has implications for the (internal) organizational structure
of the firms and for the markets in the economy (we assumed the existence of a stock
market). A precise definition of corporation was given in the introduction.
The discussion was carried out at a basic level, trying to provide examples and
intuition for the conceptual and technical difficulties that arise in these models, and how
these difficulties have been addressed in the literature.
Some other issues with these models were left out of the discussion. For example,
we did little mention of the literature of GEI models with asymmetry of information,
default and collateral, which certainly brings new difficulties and interesting problems
and for which there is a wealth of literature.
Also, we restricted our attention to models in which we assume competitive behavior.
Other models have a more strategic approach or a mixture of general equilibrium for
the economy and strategic behavior for the shareholders of the firm. See for example
DeMarzo [6], which incorporates voting.
In general, one gets the sense that although most of the problems that arise in these
models have been addressed, there is still no consensus among economists about which
is the “best” way to model these economies. This is reasonable given the nature of the
difficulties described. Take for example the different pricing functions we mentioned.
Models with partial spanning have nice properties (unanimity, efficiency) but at a cost
of imposing the condition that no firm can innovate and create new securities, an as-
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sumption that seems implausible given the large number of states of nature and few
number of firms one would expect to encounter in real economies. We can then turn
to a Makowski-type pricing function, which also carries the nice property of unanimity
but at the cost of having complete homogeneity in shareholders’ marginal rates of in-
tertemporal substitutions. If we allow for some heterogeneity among shareholders, like
in Grossman and Hart’s model, an equilibrium still exists but without unanimity and a
(somewhat implausible) story of side payments, or of bids and takeovers, must be told
to justify the result.
On the other hand, this lack of consensus and ongoing difficulties in GEI models
with firms are good news for economists, they signal the existence of much work to do
and interesting problems to study.
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